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Abstract
We describe the epidemiology of varicella in one state prison in California during 2010–2011, 
control measures implemented, and associated costs. Eleven varicella cases were reported, 9 
associated with 2 outbreaks. One outbreak consisted of 3 cases and the second consisted of 6 cases 
with 2 generations of spread. Among exposed inmates serologically tested, 98% (643/656) were 
VZV sero-positive. The outbreaks resulted in >1,000 inmates exposed, 444 staff exposures, and >
$160,000 in costs. We documented the challenges and costs associated with controlling and 
managing varicella in a prison setting. A screening policy for evidence of varicella immunity for 
incoming inmates and staff and vaccination of susceptible persons has the potential to mitigate the 
impact of future outbreaks and reduce resources necessary for managing cases and outbreaks.
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Varicella-zoster-virus (VZV) is a highly contagious virus, with secondary attack rates in 
households reaching 65%–90% (Marin, Guris, Chaves, Schmid, & Seward, 2007). VZV is 
transmitted from person to person by direct contact, inhalation of viral particles from the 
skin lesions of acute varicella or zoster, or infected respiratory tract secretions that have 
been aerosolized (Marin et al., 2007). The average incubation period is 14–16 days and 
patients with varicella are contagious 1–2 days before rash onset until all lesions are crusted 
(Marin et al., 2007). After primary infection, VZV remains dormant in the sensory-nerve 
ganglia and may reactivate at a later time to cause herpes zoster. Exposure to persons with 
either varicella or herpes zoster can lead to varicella in susceptible persons. Adults, 
immunocompromised persons, and pregnant women are at increased risk of severe varicella. 
A routine varicella vaccination program has led to substantial decreases in varicella cases, 
hospitalizations, and deaths in the United States (Marin et al., 2007).
Residents of congregate settings are at higher risk of VZV transmission. Varicella outbreaks 
have been reported in residential settings including prisons, adult residential facilities, 
hospitals, and army barracks (de Valliere et al., 2011; Enright, Mc Mahon, & Washington, 
2006; Faoagali & Darcy, 1995; Getaz et al., 2010; Grossberg et al., 2006; Leung et al., 2010; 
Levy et al., 2003; Longfield, Winn, Gibson, Juchau, & Hoffman, 1990; Noorda & Hoebe, 
2004; Valdarchi et al., 2008; Wood & Stevenson, 2004; Zimmerman et al., 2003). In 
prisons, factors identified as contributing to transmission of infectious diseases include 
crowding, constant close contact, and movement of inmates into and between prisons (Bick, 
2007; “Federal Bureau of Prisons: Management of Varicella Zoster Virus (VZV) Infections: 
Clinical Practice Guideline,” 2011). VZV can be introduced into prisons by staff, visitors, or 
prisoners with varicella or herpes zoster. Because inmates are adolescents or adults and have 
a higher prevalence of HIV infection than the general population (Bick, 2007), they are at 
higher risk of severe varicella.
Management of varicella cases and outbreaks in prison settings can lead to significant costs 
and can be disruptive (Breuer, 2004). In 2009, 1.5 million persons were living in state or 
federal prisons in the United States, a considerable population at increased risk of infectious 
diseases (“Glaze LE. Bureau of Justice Statistics: Correctional Populations in the United 
States, 2009. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice; 2010. Available at http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf “). As of December 2010, the in-prison 
population in California was 162,821 and prisons were operating at 170% of housing 
capacity (“California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Office of Public and 
Employee Communications. Corrections-Year at a glance-Fall 2011,”). Varicella is the most 
common vaccine-preventable disease in California state correctional institutions, with 
approximately 40 inmate cases reported annually (Mohle-Boetani J. Cost-benefit of varicella 
prevention in state prisons in California. In: Program and abstracts of the 2011 Academic 
and Health Policy Conference on Correctional Health (Boston). Worcester, MA: University 
of Massachusetts Medical School. Available at: http://
www.correctionalhealthconference.com/2011-presentations#seminars). To better understand 
the burden of varicella in prison settings, we described the epidemiology of varicella in one 
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Prison A has approximately 2,000 staff, including 1,228 non-healthcare, 377 healthcare, and 
453 support staff. Approximately 5,000 male inmates are housed in Prison A, half of whom 
are transitional inmates who are housed temporarily for an average of 6 months-2 years. 
Transitional inmates first enter a reception center and are housed separately from permanent 
inmates. Prison A consists of segregated cell blocks, also called units, which differ in 
housing arrangement (dormitory-style, double-cell, single-cell), level of inmate participation 
in work, educational, and recreational activities, and visitation rights based on the level of 
security required to guard the inmates. Prison A receives an average of 400 new inmates 
weekly, makes 300 bed moves daily, and operates at approximately 200% of capacity. 
Inmates may interact with each other within the prison through dining, activities, work, and 
bed moves; they may have contact with the community through interactions with staff, 
visitors, and transfer to court. Based on voluntary screening, it is estimated that 
approximately 2% of inmates in Prison A are potentially immunosuppressed, primarily due 
to HIV infection (~85%). Prison A has 7 medical clinics that provide non-urgent and urgent 
medical care, and 3 airborne infection isolation rooms.
Epidemiologic investigation
A varicella case was defined as a diagnosis of varicella in an inmate made by a healthcare 
provider between 1/1/10–12/31/11. A varicella outbreak was defined as ≥3 varicella cases 
over a 2-month period. For laboratory confirmation of cases, blood and lesion specimens 
were sent to a commercial laboratory for PCR, viral culture, or IgM testing. Healthcare staff 
in Prison A collected demographic and clinical information on varicella case-patients.
Inmate exposure was defined as direct contact with nasopharyngeal secretions or skin 
lesions, face-to-face interactions, or sharing indoor airspace (within approximately 3 feet of 
an index case) for ≥1 hour during a varicella case’s infectious period (defined as 2 days 
before rash onset until isolation). For inmates living in settings where they had frequent 
interaction with other inmates in their unit, all were considered exposed if a varicella case 
was identified in the unit, whereas for those living in a single-cell unit who had limited 
interaction with other inmates, only inmates living 5 cells left and right of the varicella case-
patient, and 11 cells on the floors directly above and below the varicella case-patient (an 
area 66 feet wide x 24 feet high) were considered to have shared indoor space and to have 
been exposed. A conservative definition of exposure was used because some studies have 
found that airborne transmission of VZV through ventilation systems is possible (Gustafson 
et al., 1982; Leclair, Zaia, Levin, Congdon, & Goldmann, 1980); additionally, cells have 
barred doors that permit airflow from surrounding cells. Healthcare staff used custody 
movement sheets, databases, and rosters of inmates in transport buses, classrooms, chapels, 
visitor centers, dining halls, parole hearing sites, and work areas to identify possible 
exposures.
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Exposed inmates were assessed for evidence of immunity to varicella. In 2010, assessment 
was based on the country and year of birth with inmates born in the United States before 
1980 considered to have evidence of immunity per ACIP criteria (Marin et al., 2007). An 
inmate’s self-reported history of varicella was not considered evidence of immunity. 
Inmates born outside the United States, or US-born after 1979 were assessed using serology. 
In 2011, all exposed inmates were tested for laboratory evidence of immunity. Testing was 
performed at a commercial or state public health laboratory. Documentation of varicella 
vaccination status was not available.
Varicella outbreak cost assessment
Data were collected on costs related to staff hours needed to manage varicella cases and 
exposed inmates, isolation of varicella case-patients, collection and laboratory testing of 
specimens, and vaccination of susceptible inmates.
Approval from an institutional review board was not required because data was collected as 
part of a public health response.
Results
I. Epidemiologic Investigation
Epidemiology of varicella cases and outbreaks—A total of 11 varicella cases were 
reported in Prison A during 2010–2011; 9 were associated with 2 outbreaks. None of the 11 
varicella case-patients were immuncompromised or had any varicella-related complications. 
Characteristics of cases are described in Table 1.
One outbreak occurred in 2010 and comprised 3 co-incident case-patients (rash onsets: 
1/16/10–1/23/10), all of whom were housed in different units. The case-patients had no 
known contact with each other or any visitors during 3 weeks before rash onset; it could not 
be determined whether any staff had contact with all 3 cases. Two cases occurred among 
inmates living in a single-cell unit (47 year-old and 19 year-old), and one case occurred in 
an inmate (24 year-old) who lived in a dormitory-style setting. During the 3 weeks before 
rash onset, all three cases only participated in activities with others in their respective units.
A second outbreak occurred in 2011 that resulted in 2 generations of spread for a total of 6 
cases (3 secondary and 2 tertiary; rash onsets: 2/12/11–3/25/11) in 1 unit. The affected unit 
housed 900 inmates who lived in double cells. Inmates spent the majority of their time in 
communal areas and dined together. They had exposure to outside visitors and involvement 
in educational, recreational, and work activities. It is unknown whether these 6 cases had 
contact with visitors 3 weeks before rash onset. The index case was in a 42-year old, who 
worked in the kitchen; the age range of remaining cases was 34–58 years. The index case’s 
exposure source could not be determined. The likely transmission setting for secondary and 
tertiary cases was the common area shared by the inmates in the unit. No other varicella 
cases were identified outside of this unit.
Two sporadic cases, one each in 2010 and 2011, occurred in inmates aged 27 and 33 years, 
who were housed in 2 different units, which were not affected by the 2 outbreaks. The 
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sporadic cases occurred 7 months and 2 months after the last reported rash onsets of the 
outbreak-related cases in 2010 and 2011 and were not linked to the outbreak cases. Their 
source of exposure could not be determined.
No cases of herpes zoster were identified among inmates or staff during the study period. 
Additionally, no varicella cases were reported in staff after exposure to inmates with 
varicella, although reporting by staff was voluntary.
VZV seroepidemiology among inmates—In 2010, sera was collected from inmates 
from 2 units exposed to the outbreak-related cases who did not meet the criteria for evidence 
of immunity (i.e., were foreign-born or US-born after 1979). Of 260 inmates identified with 
uncertain immune status, 249 were tested and 248 (99.6%) were VZV IgG seropositive. In 
2011, of 407 inmates serologically tested in the affected unit, 395 (97.0%) were VZV IgG 
seropositive. Among 13 that were not VZV IgG seropositive (9 seronegative and 4 
equivocal), the median age of the inmates was 44 years (range, 32–64 years); all but 1 were 
US-born.
Control Measures for case-patients and exposed inmates—Varicella case-
patients were isolated in airborne infection isolation rooms until their lesions crusted over. 
Cases were isolated for a median of 6 days (range, 6–10 days). Two outbreak-related case-
patients in 2011 were temporarily admitted to a local hospital for isolation due to 
unavailability of airborne infection isolation rooms in the prison.
There were >1,000 inmates exposed. To prevent spread to other units, exposed inmates were 
confined to their housing units until evidence of immunity could be determined (an average 
of 2–3 weeks). Ten VZV-seronegative inmates were vaccinated with 2 doses of varicella 
vaccine >5 days post-exposure; vaccines were provided by the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).
Management of Exposed Staff—Following identification of inmate case-patients, steps 
were taken to notify all staff of the inmate cases, identify exposed staff, investigate their 
evidence of immunity to varicella, and refer non-immune exposed staff to a contracted 
occupational health provider for postexposure medical evaluation. Staff were considered 
exposed if they may have had ≥5 minutes of direct contact with secretions, face-to-face 
contact, or had been in a small enclosed space with a case-patient. At least 444 staff 
exposures among staff in the affected units were identified during the 2010 outbreak (some 
staff may have had multiple exposures). Prison healthcare staff educated staff about the 
symptoms of varicella, increased risk of severe disease in immunocompromised or pregnant 
persons, and encouraged staff to notify prison officials if they developed symptoms of 
varicella.
Exposed healthcare staff were asked to provide evidence of immunity based on guidelines 
by ACIP (Marin et al., 2007) and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) (“Federal Bureau of 
Prisons: Management of Varicella Zoster Virus (VZV) Infections: Clinical Practice 
Guideline,” 2011) in response to the outbreak, which included: 2 doses of varicella vaccine, 
provider diagnosis of varicella or herpes zoster, or laboratory evidence of immunity or 
Leung et al. Page 5













disease. Non-healthcare workers were asked to self-attest their year and country of birth, and 
underlying medications and conditions. Based on their responses, a return-to-work 
coordinator determined the need for referral to an occupational health provider for further 
evaluation.
II. Varicella outbreak cost assessment
The total estimated costs for management of cases and exposed contacts among inmates in 
Prison A during the two outbreaks in 2010–2011 was $161,042.88. Estimated costs are 
shown in Table 2.
There were also additional costs that could not be quantified. To implement measures to 
control transmission among inmates, staff were diverted from their routine duties to focus on 
case and outbreak management and control. Additional staff were needed to monitor isolated 
case-patients and exposed quarantined inmates. This was achieved either by re-deployment 
of staff from other areas or through overtime. Healthcare staff time and resources were 
required to implement the screening tool to assess evidence of immunity to varicella (year 
and country of birth), collect blood for VZV IgG testing, track inmate varicella titers, 
vaccinate VZV seronegative inmates, evaluate quarantined and isolated inmates on a daily 
basis, and document results. Because prison health care systems do not have robust patient 
population registries to track these data, an electronic Access database was developed by 
healthcare staff to track these data and manage the outbreaks. This database can be used in 
the future to facilitate control of varicella. Extensive staff time was also spent on conference 
calls among staff in Prison A, CDCR, and California Department of Public Health (CDPH).
While exposed inmates were confined to their units, they were unable to participate in 
routine activities, work, and scheduled visits to court. At the height of the 2011 outbreak, 
Prison A had almost 1,000 inmates on quarantine, many of whom routinely perform critical 
janitorial, clerical, and food service tasks. Activities that were not classified as critical such 
as education, manufacturing, religious, visiting, and yard recreation were severely limited 
during the outbreak, with one unit on quarantine for a month. Operational staff were 
required to identify and train inmates from non-quarantined areas to continue the core 
functions of the prison. In addition, quarantine of exposed inmates affected bed moves, 
transfers into and out of Prison A, and scheduled appointments with visitors.
Discussion
The experience of Prison A demonstrates the challenges and costs associated with 
controlling and managing varicella in a prison setting. We documented the quantifiable and 
non-quantifiable costs from disruption of routine activities, medical evaluation, serologic 
testing, isolation of hundreds of inmates (ill and exposed), and >400 staff exposures, which 
resulted in >$160,000 spent. The sources of exposure for the two outbreaks, which remain 
unknown, likely were due to an unrecognized varicella or herpes zoster case in a staff, 
inmate, or visitor. The high baseline VZV seroprevalence among inmates, which mirrored 
that of the non-incarcerated U.S. population, likely contributed to limiting disease 
transmission. Nevertheless, despite high seroprevalence and implementation of control 
measures, transmission among inmates still occurred. A screening policy for evidence of 
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varicella immunity for incoming inmates and staff and a vaccination program for those 
presumed to be susceptible has the potential to mitigate the impact of future outbreaks and 
reduce resources necessary for managing cases and outbreaks.
Varicella outbreaks have been previously described in prison populations (Getaz et al., 
2010; Levy et al., 2003; Prevention., 1989; Valdarchi et al., 2008; Wood & Stevenson, 
2004), including several with high VZV seroprevalence (86–99%) (Getaz et al., 2010; 
Prevention., 1989; Valdarchi et al., 2008), providing evidence that prisons are settings with 
high risk for exposure and transmission. Although no complications were reported among 
case-patients in this outbreak, VZV infection can lead to severe disease in populations with 
higher proportions of immunocompromising conditions, as evidenced by a fatal case of 
varicella pneumonia previously reported in a HIV-positive inmate (Valdarchi et al., 2008). 
Our investigation highlights the challenges in controlling disease transmission in this high 
exposure setting (Baillargeon et al., 2004; Bick, 2007; Breuer, 2004; Restum, 2005). 
Transmission can occur in the same or another prison unit, and through contact with staff, 
visitors, and the community through work and activities within the prison, and movement to 
another facility in the prison system or court (Levy et al., 2003). Effective control measures 
require timely identification of cases and exposures and implementation of an immediate 
response when a varicella case is identified, which can be resource-intensive and disruptive 
for both inmates and staff. Challenges also involve the ability to determine who may have 
been exposed to varicella and the extent of their contact with the case-patients. Identifying 
exposed inmates at risk of disease or of severe disease is difficult since information on prior 
varicella disease, vaccinations, and underlying conditions and medications, are often 
unavailable, incomplete, or not easily accessible. Furthermore, the ability to isolate case-
patients and exposed inmates within prison facilities is often constrained by limited numbers 
of airborne infection isolation rooms and areas in which to isolate exposed. Occasionally, 
inmate case-patients who do not clinically require hospitalization are transferred to a local 
hospital for isolation purposes, which adds additional costs. One cost-benefit analysis found 
that universal screening and vaccination of varicella-susceptible inmates in the CA state 
prison population would save $1.3 million and prevent 116 varicella cases in a 5-year period 
as compared to post-exposure screening and vaccinating inmates (Mohle-Boetani J. Cost-
benefit of varicella prevention in state prisons in California. In: Program and abstracts of 
the 2011 Academic and Health Policy Conference on Correctional Health (Boston). 
Worcester, MA: University of Massachusetts Medical School. Available at: http://
www.correctionalhealthconference.com/2011-presentations#seminars). The study 
compared: 1) the costs that the California Correctional Health Care Services paid for 
varicella case managment (including the cost of respiratory isolation) and exposure response 
(e.g., cost of identifying susceptible contacts who needed quarantine) and 2) the predicted 
costs of screening the entire prison population, providing vaccinations to susceptible 
inmates, and varicella case management and exposure response assuming a reduction of 
cases by 60% (the proportion of susceptible inmates expected to accept vaccination). 
Additional studies to assess the cost-effectiveness of universal screening and vaccination in 
prison settings would be valuable for guiding the development of varicella disease control 
recommendations in prison populations.
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Infectious disease prevention and control among healthcare and non-healthcare staff in 
prisons can also be challenging. Accurate identification of exposed staff and those with 
significant exposures is difficult because staff may be assigned to multiple prison locations 
as needed. Fortunately, despite the identification of ≥444 staff exposures during the 2010 
outbreak, no cases of varicella were reported among staff. However, it is possible that some 
staff developed varicella, but did not notify prison officials. California Penal Code 6006 et 
seq. authorizes CDCR to evaluate staff for tuberculosis infectiousness and remove staff from 
work if they do not provide requested certification that they are not contagious (“California 
Penal Code Section 6006–6009,”). There is no similar provision for varicella infections. 
Although regulations exist requiring employers to exclude patients with symptoms of 
aerosol transmissible diseases, there are major challenges in detecting symptoms among 
staff and administrative challenges in excluding these staff. Similar to the findings of the 
cost-benefit study among inmates (Mohle-Boetani J. Cost-benefit of varicella prevention in 
state prisons in California. In: Program and abstracts of the 2011 Academic and Health 
Policy Conference on Correctional Health (Boston). Worcester, MA: University of 
Massachusetts Medical School. Available at: http://www.correctionalhealthconference.com/
2011-presentations#seminars), universal screening and vaccination of susceptible staff 
would likely be cost-saving if combined with record-keeping to document immune status 
and policies that target post-exposure medical evaluation towards staff without documented 
immunity. ACIP has recommended that special considerations for varicella vaccination 
should be given to those working in environments with high-risk of exposure, including 
correctional institutions (Marin et al., 2007). Ensuring immunity among healthcare staff 
ensures protection for staff and reduces post-exposure follow-up. For other staff, a 
requirement for evidence of immunity to varicella and other vaccine-preventable diseases 
should also be considered.
An effective method for preventing varicella cases and outbreaks in prison settings is to 
screen all staff and incoming prisoners for evidence of immunity to varicella, vaccinate 
susceptible inmates and staff with 2-doses of varicella vaccine on entry, and electronically 
document this information so that it is readily available in the event of a VZV exposure. 
Facilities may choose to screen by asking about varicella disease history or by serologic 
testing. In general, studies have found that self-reported history is a reliable marker of 
varicella history for adults (Getaz et al., 2010; Perella et al., 2009; Valdarchi et al., 2008), 
although one study found that the positive predictive value of reported history was low 
(Wallace et al., 1997). In 2010, two of the cases of varicella occurred among Prison A 
inmates with self-reported history of varicella.
Birth in the US before 1980 is a criterion for evidence of varicella immunity for the general 
population [1] based on seroepidemiologic data indicating that >99% of the non-
institutionalized US population in that age group has VZV IgG antibodies (Reynolds, 
Kruszon-Moran, Jumaan, Schmid, & McQuillan, 2010). Three-quarters of the cases in our 
investigation were US-born before 1980. Although the number of cases in our investigation 
was small, in a separate analysis of 80 cases of varicella reported from California prisons, 
40% were in inmates born in the US before 1980 (California Correctional Health Care 
Services, unpublished data). These findings raised the question of whether the incarcerated 
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population might have a different history of exposure to VZV than the general population or 
whether the crowded conditions in prisons more effectively facilitate transmission. Effective 
December 2011, the Federal BOP guidelines no longer use birth in the United States before 
1980 as evidence of immunity to varicella (“Federal Bureau of Prisons: Management of 
Varicella Zoster Virus (VZV) Infections: Clinical Practice Guideline,” 2011).
There were several limitations to our investigation. Costs incurred in 2010 and 2011 were 
not standardized and data obtained may have been subject to recall bias since they were 
collected several months after varicella cases occurred. We likely underestimated true costs 
of outbreak control as we were unable to include several important cost categories: extra-
hours spent by prison A staff, CDCR, and the state and local health departments, costs 
associated with laboratory testing of cases, and costs related to managing exposed staff. In 
addition, if all testing had been performed at the commercial laboratory, costs would have 
been higher. Other costs that could not be measured include disruption to the prison system 
while isolating cases and quarantining exposed inmates, stopping inmate movement, and 
reorganizing and diverting staff from their routine activities.
We have documented the risk of varicella transmission in prisons and the significant costs 
and challenges associated with controlling and managing varicella cases and outbreaks in 
prison settings. Prisons should have clear guidelines for VZV prevention and control to 
ensure that: 1) appropriate control measures and evaluation of exposed persons are promptly 
implemented when a single varicella or herpes zoster case is identified (“Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC). Control & Investigation of Varicella Outbreaks,” ; “Federal 
Bureau of Prisons: Management of Varicella Zoster Virus (VZV) Infections: Clinical 
Practice Guideline,” 2011); and 2) inmates and staff with varicella, disseminated herpes 
zoster, or localized herpes zoster among immuncompromised persons are isolated or 
furloughed from work or activities; those with localized herpes zoster who are 
immuncompetent may continue to participate in activities and work if they are able to 
completely cover their lesions (“California Department of Industrial Relations. 5199. 
Aerosol Transmissible Diseases,” ; “Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
Control & Investigation of Varicella Outbreaks,” ; “Federal Bureau of Prisons: Management 
of Varicella Zoster Virus (VZV) Infections: Clinical Practice Guideline,” 2011). Although 
we were unable to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of a universal screening and vaccination 
strategy through this investigation, one study found this strategy would both prevent cases 
and reduce costs (Mohle-Boetani J. Cost-benefit of varicella prevention in state prisons in 
California. In: Program and abstracts of the 2011 Academic and Health Policy Conference 
on Correctional Health (Boston). Worcester, MA: University of Massachusetts Medical 
School. Available at: http://www.correctionalhealthconference.com/2011-
presentations#seminars). Implementation of screening and vaccination of susceptible 
inmates and staff upon entry or employment, and ready access to this information has the 
potential to help prevent varicella cases and outbreaks and reduce the costs and challenges 
related to controlling VZV transmission.
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Table 1
Characteristics of case-patients in Prison A, California 2010–2011 (N=11)
Characteristic
Median Age in years (range) 37 (19–58)
US-born; # (%) 11 (100)
 US-born before 1980 8 (73)
Median years ever in an adult correctional facility (range) 19 (0–37)
Median years in an adult correctional facility for most recent sentence before rash onseta (range) 13 (0–23)
Permanent Inmate; # (%) 8 (73%)
Immunocompromising conditions; # (%) 0 (0)
Outbreak-associated case; # (%) 9 (82)
Documented prior varicella disease history; # (%) 0 (0)
Documented prior varicella vaccination history; # (%) 0 (0)
VZV laboratory confirmedb # (%) 5 (45)
Treated with acyclovir; # (%) 2 (18)
Isolated at the Prison A’s airborne infection isolation rooms 11 (100)
Isolated at the local hospital 2 (18)
a
All 6 outbreak-related cases that occurred in 2011 in unit D were among inmates who had been at Prison A for 9–23 years.
b
VZV viral culture, PCR, or IgM testing.
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Table 2
Estimated costs for varicella outbreak control activities in Prison A, California 2010–2011
Cost Category Estimated Cost
Estimated costs incurred by Prison A $156,548.88
Public health nurse, licensed vocational nurse, and phlebotomist staff timea $23,307.44
Isolation of inmate case-patients in the prison’s airborne infection isolation rooms $18,408.00
Isolation of inmate case-patients in a local hospitalb $23,325.44
Laboratory testing of serologic samples from exposed inmates by a commercial laboratory $1,808.00
Vaccinating 10 seronegative inmates with 2-doses of varicella vaccinec $1,700.00
Lost prison industry production in 2011 due to isolation of inmates (ill and exposed)d $88,000.00
Estimated costs incurred by CA Public Health Department $4,494.00
Laboratory testing of serologic samples from exposed inmates by the public health laboratory $4,494.00
Total estimated costs incurred by either Prison A or CA Public Health Department $161,042.88
a
More than full time management by the Chief Medical Officer (CMO), Chief Physician and Surgeon (CP&S), and Public Health Nurse (PHN) 
were required to manage cases and exposures. CMO and CP&S positions are not eligible for overtime pay.
b
Cases were isolated at the local hospital because OHU airborne infection isolation rooms were unavailable. Estimated costs included prison staff 
time to monitor isolated cases in the hospital ($4,900).
c
The cost of varicella vaccine was $85 per dose; 4 inmates with equivocal VZV IgG results were not vaccinated.
d
Isolated inmates were unable to work in furniture or mattress manufacturing, which resulted in costs lost by the California Production Industry 
Authority. Estimated costs not available from the 2010 outbreak.
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